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Abstract
Although the traditional biosecurity paradigm is concerned with the deliberate misuse of biological agents, in
recent years national security strategies have widened in scope to address a much wider spectrum of biological
threats. This expanding remit, partly spurred by the high-profile epidemics of the early 2000s, still does not include
conditions that have been traditionally conceived as non-infectious. Non-communicable diseases (NCDs), including
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancers, and chronic respiratory diseases, are together responsible for 70 per
cent of deaths worldwide. Heart disease and cancer have long been the leading causes of death in high-income
countries but the increasing availability of tobacco, alcohol, processed food and western lifestyles have led to a
boom in deaths from NCDs in low-income settings over recent decades. The substantial socio-economic burden
levied by NCDs can undermine political stability in fragile states by straining weak health systems and exacerbating
social inequalities. This review article argues that the rise of NCDs is a threat to international security, and that
departments of defence have a central role to play in the prevention and control of these diseases. NCDs
compromise the integrity of standing armies, incur large military opportunity costs, threaten the health of domestic
populations, restrict economic growth in the developing world, stoke socioeconomic inequalities and seed social
unrest in fragile states. Greater defence spending on domestic and international efforts to promote health and
manage NCDs should be a core function of defence departments mandated to promote global security.
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Introduction
Although disease has always been a serious threat to international
security, it cannot be combatted with sabres or rifles and generals have
historically assumed that the prevention and control of illness lies
beyond the ambit of national defence [1,2]. The practice of artificially
dividing health and security and managing them in separate silos has
been challenged by the unfolding process of globalization. Pandemics
such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and swine flu
(H1N1) have catalysed the evolution of the modern concept of
international security that extends beyond military preparedness to
mitigating and managing non-traditional threats including climate
change, terrorism, migration, and political volatility [3]. Although
infectious diseases are now firmly established as a core concern for
defence ministers and subject to comprehensive biosecurity strategies,
non-communicable diseases represent a far greater threat to
international security, yet they remain on the outskirts of the security
agenda [4].
Non-communicable Diseases
In the pre-industrial era infectious diseases, violence and famine
were the leading causes of death and disability worldwide [5]. As
nations modernised, public health and sanitation measures achieved
huge reductions in mortality from diarrhoea, tuberculosis, pneumonia
and plague [6,7]. The nature of conflict has also changed significantly
over the past few centuries. Violence and murder rates have
plummeted over the last 500 years and today 95 per cent of all armed
conflict takes place within – as opposed to between – states [8,9]. Early
death from violence, starvation and infection has been largely
superseded by degenerative and ‘man-made’ conditions; driven by
overconsumption of alcohol, unhealthy food, tobacco, and insufficient
physical activity. These so-called non-communicable diseases (NCDs)
include heart disease, cancers, diabetes, mental illness and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease [10,11]. These conditions currently
account for 69% of global deaths (including 16 million premature
deaths every year) and this proportion is growing [12].
Many developing countries are experiencing a ‘double burden of
disease’ with malnourished citizens and weak health systems on one
hand and the increasing affordability, accessibility and cultural
desirability of western lifestyles leading to an NCD boom on the other
[13]. Although NCDs have been portrayed as ‘diseases of affluence’,
people living in developing countries are 1.5 times more likely to die
from an NCD before their 70th birthday compared with individuals
living in high income countries [14]. Although cardiovascular disease
and cancers remain the leading cause of death in high-income
countries, there have been large reductions in age-standardised death
rates over recent decades [15]. At the same time industrial and
demographic transitions in the developing world have seen non-
communicable diseases account for an increasing share of total deaths
[16]. Globalization is a major driver of the increasing availability of
unhealthy products and lifestyles in low-income and fragile states [17].
Globally NCDs levy vast economic costs – an estimated $47 trillion in
lost output to the world economy by 2030 [18]. They also exacerbate
socioeconomic inequalities and seed social unrest.
A Convergence of Concerns
Although health and defence have traditionally occupied separate
domains, in recent years the significant overlaps between health and
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national security have been recognised by policymakers in both
spheres. Many medical innovations and technologies currently used in
emergency rooms and operating theatres have military origins.
Breakthroughs in surgery, trauma care, circulatory access, prosthetics
and rehabilitation have come from the field of battle or military R&D.
Contemporary examples of these partnerships abound, for instance
shared interest in organ preservation has led the Department of
Defence (DoD) to seed fund seven different medical research groups in
the USA [19].
The negative side of the relationship between conflict and health is
self-evident. Conflict kills and maims, it destroys public health
infrastructure, disrupts medical supply chains, frustrates basic
sanitation measures, kills healthcare workers, and prompts mass
migration. These circumstances lead to mental illness, an inability to
treat other non-communicable diseases, and the flourishing of
infectious diseases [20].
Globalization has exposed all countries to threats such as SARS,
Ebola and Zika virus. The growing recognition that these epidemics
undermine national security is slowly being extended to transnational
non-infectious vectors of disease including sugary drinks, tobacco and
processed foods.
NCDs and Biosecurity
Biosecurity is the established nexus of health and defence but the
current definition does not encompass the true extent of the overlap.
Stemming from agriculture, biosecurity evolved as measures to protect
crops and livestock from infectious disease [21,22]. Galvanised by
biological terrorist attacks at the turn of the millennium [23,24], the
term was co-opted by national defence departments and applied to
populations at risk from bioterrorism [25].
The 2000s represents somewhat of a watershed as the remit of
national defence was broadened to encompass public health in the
USA [26]. A seminal US National Intelligence Council report
acknowledged that diseases endanger citizens at home and abroad,
threaten military personnel, and exacerbate social and political
instability in regions where the USA has strategic interests [27].
Following SARS and H1N1 the UN High-Level Panel on Threats
called for an emphasis on countering biological security challenges
[28]. The 2006 US National Security Strategy classified pandemics at
the same level of threat as terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons [29].
In 2014 the UN Security Council passed its third health-related
resolution declaring Ebola a “threat to international peace and
security” [30]. The Obama administration’s 2009 National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats significantly widened the scope of
biodefense from countering misuse of biological agents to addressing
the full spectrum of biological threats to humans, plants, animals and
critical resources.
NCDs as a Threat to International Security
The global rise of obesity, diabetes, premature strokes, heart attacks,
cancers, and chronic respiratory diseases directly threatens
international security. Non-communicable diseases compromise the
integrity of standing armies, feed inequalities and social unrest in
fragile states, and threaten the health of domestic populations.
Former US Army general JE Wilson has cited child obesity as a
“threat to national security” as a quarter of young adults are unable to
serve in the military due to excess body fat [31,32]. This issue is not
confined to the USA. Forty per cent of German soldiers are overweight
and 8.5 per cent are ‘seriously overweight’ - uncomfortable figures that
constitute a significant disadvantage on the battlefield, by the German
MoD’s own admission [33]. The US military health insurance system
(TRICARE) spends over $1 billion a year treating weight-related NCDs
including diabetes and heart disease [34]. An obesity-related medical
expense for soldiers on limited duty costs an additional $5,000 million
per year [35]. These expenses represent significant opportunity costs
for defence departments as the resources could be used elsewhere.
A Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force on NCDs in low-
and middle-income countries (LMICs) warned that the impact of
NCDs on the working-age poor is undermining Western interests in
these settings [36]. The epidemic is estimated to cost these nations
$21.3 trillion in lost output over the next 20 years; significantly
constraining the economies of strategic trade partners [37]. Western
exports like processed foods and alcohol products are partly to blame
for the rising prevalence of NCDs in developing countries, and anger at
continued ‘Coca-Colonisation’ can ferment social unrest and aid
radicalisation. NCDs exacerbate socioeconomic disparities,
disproportionately afflicting the most disadvantaged and trapping
families in poverty through medical bankruptcy and lost employment.
Inequitable social conditions contribute to political volatility which is
an increasingly important foreign policy concern. Unsurprisingly the
CFR report concludes that in order to secure Western interests in
developing countries, addressing NCDs should be considered a
strategic priority.
Unprecedented levels of migration from Syria, Afghanistan and
North Africa has prompted many European leaders to emphasise the
importance of investing in prevention of political instability: British
premier David Cameron recently outlined a £100 million package to
rebuild fragile states bordering Syria and has overseen a realignment of
the national development strategy to “tackle the causes of instability,
insecurity and conflict” [38,39]. Combatting NCDs through
investment in health systems and supporting prevention programmes
is a core plank in reducing political and social volatility in fragile
states.
Finally, NCDs threaten security by directly harming domestic
citizens. These conditions kill millions more than armed conflict and
terrorism combined, and increasingly strike at younger ages [40,41].
NCDs as Communicable Diseases
Biosecurity is almost exclusively concerned with infectious diseases.
Although the current conceptualisation will inevitably broaden, the
notion that NCDs are non-infectious is also being challenged. The
dominant NCD narrative has been than these conditions are caused by
behaviour; namely greed and laziness. In recent years it has become
apparent that the environment and social meta-trends are also
instrumental. Poverty, urbanisation, population ageing, globalization
and the increasing marketing, affordability and availability of
unhealthy products are the most significant drivers of the epidemic
[42]. Many NCDs can be passed from person to person, either through
virial transmission as in the case of liver and cervical cancer [43,44] or
as emerging research demonstrates - through social networks, the built
environment, social and economic conditions, and intergenerational
transmission [45-49]. It would seem that the term ‘non-communicable’
is a complete misnomer. More importantly, NCDs behave in a similar
way to the classical infectious threats that the field of biosecurity
concerns itself with.
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It is also worth mentioning that combating NCDs requires
comprehensive, coordinated, and multi-sectoral action. Agricultural
policy, housing, education, transport, zoning laws, social security and
access to health services all determine the distribution of NCD risk
factors in a society. A comprehensive prevention and control strategy
transcends all policy silos, not just health and defence.
NCDs are a major contemporary threat to international security.
They seed unrest in volatile states, take the lives of billions around the
globe, restrict economic growth, and are slowly neutering armies at
home and overseas. For historic reasons the current biosecurity
paradigm does not afford NCDs the status they are due. Retired US
military leaders and the US Assistant Secretary of Defence for Health
Affairs have called attention to the “national security problem” of
NCDs [31-50]. More needs to be done.
Military Exercise
Just as the concept of international development has evolved and
broadened in scope, the international security community needs to
acknowledge and manage the significant security implications of the
NCD boom. The most obvious ‘upstream’ way to accomplish this is
earmarking defence funding for the prevention and control of NCDs at
home and in fragile states. A separate budgetary line for NCD
prevention and control directly supports the aim of securing
international peace.
Defence departments also need to acknowledge their role in
ensuring that the general population is fit and healthy. There are signs
that the US military is already awakening to this responsibility: retired
US generals have been using their influence to lobby the federal
government to improve the nutritional quality of school meals [51] and
in some states US marines have been leading exercise classes for
children [31]. Defence departments are well resourced to teach fitness
and should invest more in supporting healthy lifestyles at the
population level. These activates should be viewed as investments
rather than costs because a healthier population not only benefits
military recruiters, but increases commercial productivity, boosting
general taxation revenues and defence spending where this is a set
proportion of gross domestic product (e.g. 2% for NATO member
states) [52,53].
Technical and budgeted financial support for health systems in
LMICs is a strategic investment for those tasked with securing
international peace. Military departments should partner with
development and health departments, utilising the unique skills and
resources of each agency. High-level commitments towards tackling
NCDs as a core security issue would expedite these advancements.
Lastly, and perhaps most fundamentally, the biosecurity paradigm
must evolve to accommodate NCDs. The threat posed to international
security prohibits the continued, unthinking eschewal of these
conditions from the biosecurity agenda.
Disclaimer
The author alone is responsible for the views expressed in this
article. This article does not represent the official position of the World
Health Organization.
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